such as C.S. Prakash from Tuskagee University in the US who has made several high-profile visits to India. The epicentre of this national push is the company's "government and public affairs" department based in Mumbai.
On the research side, Monsanto has sought to build bridges and create legitimacy for its activities through collaborations with public sector institutes. One example of this would be the companies' collaboration with the respected research organisation TERI (The Energy and Resources Institute) and Michigan State University. 5 With funding from USAID, the idea is to develop a "golden mustard" that will yield cooking oil high in vitamin A. It is claimed Monsanto had no interest in taking through to commercialisation what is regarded as a "humanitarian crop" 6 aimed, industry sources insist, at 'helping hundreds of thousands of children suffering from vitamin A deficiencies' (AIBA 2000b) . Besides the PR benefits that the firm derives from such collaborations, alliances with groups such as TERI also serve other politically important functions. TERI has hosted a number of "stakeholder dialogues" on biotechnology and biosafety issues bringing together a select number of researchers, NGOs such as Gene campaign, and firms such as Monsanto and Syngenta to produce recommendations for government advocating clarity on approval procedures and reduced approval times. 7 To the extent that the recommendations come from a broader, though selective, group of actors in the debate than industry alone, they help to validate industry arguments that there exists cross-sectoral support for biotechnology in India. Associating with TERI also opens up other indirect channels of access because the institute is represented on all DBT committees and so enjoys a high level of access to government decision-making on these issues.
Monsanto has had to engage in such public-political strategies to a greater degree than other companies because of the particular fire that its activities have drawn from activists. The farmers' group KRRS (Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha) in Karnataka for example led a campaign in November 1998 to "Cremate Monsanto", burning the company's field trial sites in the state. The company has also faced allegations of engaging in "biopiracy" from prominent activist Vandana Shiva of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, as well as legal actions from the group Gene Campaign headed by Suman Sahai. It is clearly the case then that in India, as elsewhere, because of its level of commitment to biotechnology development, as well as its high profile public relations work, Monsanto has found its activities subject to greater critical public scrutiny than many other companies who are prepared to let the company front the public defence of biotechnology on their behalf.
That said, many companies feel aggrieved at the public-political strategies that Monsanto has adopted, because they believe that they have resulted in damaging repercussions for the sector as a whole.
Monsanto stands accused by activists and some of their industry counter-parts, of rushing the approval process and riding roughshod over public concerns about the technology. Activists have claimed that 5 TERI was known until very recently as the Tata Energy Research Institute. 6 Interview with Vibha Dhawan, TERI, 29 March 2001. 7 Interview with Vibha Dhawan, TERI, 29 March 2001. 'Monsanto treated India like a banana republic '. 8 This is in addition to rumours of illegal trials being undertaken with the company's full knowledge and of the use of the controversial "terminator" technology. In the latter case, confusion was generated by the fact that the trials of Bt cotton coincided with the timing of the terminator controversy on the global stage. For Monsanto this episode critically 'damaged their relations with cotton-growing farmers' according to their director of Regulatory Affairs in India R.D.Kapoor. 9 The company was forced to issue a "Statement in the Public Interest" in national newspapers clarifying that the company had not used, and had no plans to use "terminator" technology in India (Gupta 2000) . Many industry players are critical nevertheless of Monsanto's "unnecessarily aggressive and insensitive" strategy in India. While acknowledging that events in Europe have also had an impact on the progress of biotechnology in India, a member of a seed association said that 'Monsanto is doing biotechnology great damage . . . it has set things back by one decade'. Even smaller start-up firms are keen to distance themselves from Monsanto who they claim, 'through not being straight with DBT . . . have muddied the waters and damaged things for the rest of us.'
There has been a discernible shift in the political strategies of many firms in the wake of this series of controversies. Officials from other firms profess to have learnt from Monsanto's experience. Many firms now advocate more gradual, less public and less controversial routes to biotechnology research and development. Companies such as Pro-Agro that are awaiting the approval of a GM mustard variety 10 have adopted a lower profile presence in the debate, seeking to avoid the political and economic costs that Monsanto incurred. This may be wise given that the company's crop may attract high levels of public scrutiny because mustard oil is consumed as a food (Scoones 2003) . Other multinationals such as Syngenta have also kept a relatively low profile in the Indian biotech debate, preferring to use India as a base for pesticide production where costs are lower, through Syngenta Crop Protection. 11 Monsanto's experience has not served to deter companies such as Du Pont from expanding their biotech portfolio in India, however, through proposed tie-ins with the Reliance group, run by the infamous Indian entrepreneurs, the Ambani brothers, as part of a broader concentration on joint research on biotech crops and crop protection products. 12 Major food companies such as Nestlé India are also looking to develop biotech projects, supported by the company's own "Life Ventures" capital fund which has 150 million Euros to invest in 'health enhancing food and agricultural biotechnology '. 13 Alongside the MNCs, there are a number of large Indian seed companies with some interest in biotechnology. These include companies such as Rallis and Indo-American Hybrid Seeds. These remain seed companies in a traditional sense, with a strong history of plant-breeding and important experience in The company is awaiting the approval of three GM mustard seeds developed in collaboration with Aventis and PGS Belgium.
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'Syngenta to make Indian plant its global hub ', Economic Times, 23 September 2002: 10. 12 'DuPont targets 30 per cent growth', The Hindustan Times (8 February 2003: 19) ; 'Du Pont plans biotech foray in India ', Economic Times (10 February 2003: 9) ; 'Du Pont eyeing biotech, agri and fuel cell biz in India' (Financial Express, 8 February 2003: 1) ; 'Du Pont mulls large scale Indian exposure' (Economic Times, 9 July 2002: 9). tissue-culture and other "lower" tech biotechnology innovations. Though as yet they have developed little in the way of transgenics, they are courting biotech tie-ins with companies such as Avesthagen 14 and have registered interest in the production, sale and marketing of hybrid seeds. 15 Companies such as Rallis remain attractive to larger biotechnology companies because of their extensive distribution network. Rallis hybrid seeds, for example, has joint venture arrangements with Cargill on sunflower, sorghum and maize. 16 It is the reputation, access and effective delivery systems that global firms are seeking from companies such as Rallis and Indo-American Hybrid Seeds. 17 They, in turn, work with small traders such as Green Seeds Pvt, for example, who distribute seeds for Indo-American, ProAgro and Rallis. 18 Referring to his company's tie-in with PGS on the distribution side of the supply chain, one seed trader said, 'We can be in their chain, but we can't compete'. 19 Some smaller seed companies nevertheless view these tieins positively where there are synergies with existing seed production activities and indeed have visited Europe and the US searching for contacts for new commercial ventures. 20 Likewise multinationals are interested in joint ventures with local firms, to boost their credibility as legitimate players in local markets and to tap both the trust that local seed firms have built up with farmers and their understanding of the regulatory environment. A.R. Modi from Oriental Biotech in Bangalore noted 'our strategic advantage is that we know the agricultural system and have the political contacts . . . [as well as] 1,500 growers loyal to us that will accept any crops we give them'. 21 A former employee of Pioneer, for example, said although the company entered India in 1974, they spent '15 years stumbling around trying to understand the laws'.
To remedy this they sought a joint venture with a company in Chennai, in a 50/50 ownership deal. 22 Companies such as ProAgro India, the second largest seed company in India, have been able to form alliances with larger firms such as Aventis crop science whilst remaining a separate holding and not being integrated with the multinational. 23 While being part of a global "life science" company, ProAgro maintains a degree of autonomy and retains its brand name, but through alliances with partners in Europe is able to access gene constructs that would otherwise not be possible. As with other multinationals, basic research on transgenics is undertaken in western labs, in ProAgro's case in the Netherlands (Scoones 2002 Ibid. 22 Interview with Madan Khunnah, Cosmo Plantgene, 6 April 2001. As of January 2001, the company owned 100 per cent of SPIC-Chennai. 23 Interview with Dr Agnadi, Research and Development, Biotechnology ProAgro (IS). In 1999 Hoescht (AgrEvo) took over the Dutch holding company of the ProAgro group and since then has been merged with the major life science major, Aventis. once separate, are now increasingly consolidated. For more powerful players such as Du Pont, the deal may be different; the company has a longer history of operating in the country and advanced marketing skills which mean they 'don't need hand-holding by local partners'. 24 Foreign firms can buy firms for their germplasm then use it to develop transgenics like Bt cotton, taking adapted hybrids and inserting a gene to add value. 25 Alternatively, rather than establish formal tie-ins, some firms prefer to set up licensing arrangements with seed companies for the use of their transgenic technologies.
There is a tension, however, between firms with interests in biotechnology and those whose core concerns lie in the production of chemicals for agriculture. Leading biotech companies in India have insinuated that delays in approvals of their products are in part down to the lobbying of pesticide companies that stand to lose from biotechnology on the grounds that GM varieties may require fewer applications of pesticides. Many advocates of biotechnology in India even go as far as to claim that the NGOs voicing concerns about the technology are mere front groups for the chemical industry that it is alleged provides the organisations with funding. The picture is complicated by the fact that some firms have joint interests in biotech development and the pesticides and fertiliser market, such as Rallis, based in Bangalore. Besides distributing seeds for Cargill and Monsanto, Rallis maintain their core interests in pesticide and fertilizer production for which they own a 17 per cent share of the market in India. 26 They see their role as an integrated agrochemical company involved in pesticide and fertilizer production but with interests in biotechnology, particularly virus-resistant crops. Given a long history of working on chemicals and pesticides, such firms are much more cautious in their embrace of biotechnology. They are keen to hedge their bets, knowing that while pesticide markets may be showing some decline, there is still enormous demand for these products which continue to form the core of Rallis's business. This strategy means that they will be well placed to exploit whichever markets expand most rapidly. As Vice-President of Research and Development at Rallis, M.Smithyantha put it, 'chemicals are down, biotech is up, the trend is set and we have to be on board '. 27 Beyond the rhetoric, however, many acknowledge the difficulties associated with a serious investment in biotech research. Companies such as Rallis and Indo-American have to hire equipment to analyse gene sequences from bodies such as IISc in Bangalore. 28 The capacity issues for such firms include not only resources and access to gene sequences, but ability to compete for highly-skilled staff with companies like Monsanto, as well as organisational constraints within the firm where research and development is poorly integrated with production, for example. Where collaboration between these firms and multinationals is sought on biotechnology products of primary commercial importance, progress can be inhibited by the demands of multinationals for patent protection, however. In terms of financing for their work, firms such as Rallis are protected by belonging to the Tata group of industries which provides a "buffer to absorb the loss," 30 in contrast to their start-up competitors that are dependent on venture capital. Few firms enjoy this security and level of portfolio flexibility, where in Rallis's case for example, avenues of research in tissue-culture, transgenics and molecular lines are being explored simultaneously. If more advanced forms of biotechnology application were not to take-off, a resort to more traditional tissue-culture applications would still be possible. Firms such as Indo-American, however, are vulnerable to being bought up by larger multinational firms. If India continues to be seen as a potentially important strategic market for multinationals, these firms with established reputations for quality seeds, extensive distribution channels in place and good government connections, make an attractive prospect for potential buyers.
Beyond these firms, there is a smaller, but significant, group of start-up firms such as Avesthagen and BioCon, as well as outfits with close links to universities such as Strand Genomics which is run by scientists at Bangalore's IISc. Strand Genomics developed with funds from local venture and angel investors (principally local entrepreneurs and NRIs in this case) and is rated as one of the top 5 companies in the bioinformatics sector. 31 Avesthagen was founded by Villoo Patel with the backing of major banks such as ICICI and a loan from the Global Trust Bank. 32 These are newer firms, often dependent on venture capital and technology support from groups such as Biotech Consortium India 33 and with little independent capacity for production, instead often being involved in contract research which is outsourced from larger biotechnology concerns. 34 They are involved, for example, in trait identification and screening work for companies, using tools for the prediction of gene sequences or marker-assisted selection and bioinformatics. biotech group that has identified twenty venture capital firms looking for investment opportunities in the Indian biotech sector. 37 Some companies provide the raw material for the work of overseas biotech enterprises in Europe and the U.S. Bangalore Genei exports enzymes for genetic engineering research, for example. 38 This sort of contract work is, in many ways, their niche. They are at the high tide of innovation and will sink or swim with the biotech current because without core and established business concerns of their own, they necessarily operate in the uncertain "futures market" of biotechnology. Economic Times journalist, Narendar Pani notes, for example, the way venture capital lost interest towards the end of the 1990s, but that gene mapping has served to revive interest, though largely in biotech pharmaceuticals at this stage, where the strong "commercial acumen" resides. 39 This view is supported by a Confederation of Indian Industry study on the financing of biotech enterprises in India which found that less than 20 per cent of venture funds preferred to invest in agricultural biotechnology and genomics as opposed biopharmaceuticals and bioinformatics. 40 In 2002 ICICI also dropped its plans for a $25 million "Biotechnology Incubation Fund" citing 'inadequate potential in the sector and the long-run cycles involved'. 41 The role of venture capital then is key in this sort of capital-intensive work where high costs are involved, especially for service-oriented firms working on bio-informatics for example. 42 Venture capital firms, whom these smaller entrepreneurial outfits depend upon, seek a short-term return on their investments. This explains the importance that "start-up" firms attach to forms of intellectual property protection. For example BioCon holds 35 patents on its work. 43 The company, together with Strand Genomics, have courted the idea of a partnership to develop intellectual property protection for their biomarker research. 44 The need to secure IPR protection has drawn a company like Avesthagen into the policy process, where legal experts represent the company on committees. Rather like the larger lifescience outfits, they also express concerns about issues of commercial confidentiality in the reporting of lab-level biosafety studies to government. 45 The financial vulnerability of the start-ups means they are more directly and immediately affected by the politics which surround the technology's perceived popularity than some of their larger counter-parts. capitalists will now be more inclined to invest in the Indian biotech industry'. 46 Unlike the major biotech MNCs that can afford to take a longer-term perspective on innovations, markets and regulatory developments, 47 "bio-entrepreneurs" such as Villoo Patel and Dinesh Joshi have continually to "woo" venture capital firms. 48 Assessments are made of companies regarding their commitment, track-record and potential. Since banks and other investors got their "fingers burned" when the information technology bubble burst, they are more cautious with the hype around Bt and less bullish in their outlook. 49 Ghanshyam Dass, of NASDAQ Bangalore, claims that many venture capital firms still lack an understanding of the financial potential of biotechnology. In other countries, such as the US, this has been resolved through assurances from larger firms, assurances that smaller firms in India cannot provide.
Some larger seed companies in India have been well placed to seek out venture capital, however, such as Indo-American Hybrids whose director Dr. Manmohan Attavar sits on the board of the venture capital fund, UTI (Unit Trust India). 50 UTI has a technical committee to assess likely returns that can be lobbied and persuaded of positive financial gains, but UTI is seen as an exception to the many venture capital firms that lack scientific expertise. 51 Given the importance of this type of funding, the DBT has sought to develop a National Biotechnology Venture Capital Fund for biotech entrepreneurs working on smallerscale projects and the government of Karnataka, in association with the Vision group, has plans to set up its own Biotech Venture Fund. 52 This sort of "angel" investment accounts for only a fraction of the investment in biotech however, compared with private venture capital investments in India. 53 Though small in global financial terms and subject to the whims of investors, these start-ups represent an important part of the overall puzzle and are used symbolically to highlight the commercial success that biotechnology can bring to India. In this sense, their profile in policy debates currently outstrips their material contribution to the Indian economy (Scoones 2002) . The projected success of these companies has also been used to lever political influence, with Villoo Patel being part of the Vision venture stake in BioCon India. 54 The fact that multinational companies are accused by some of trying to frustrate the development of biotech products by Indian companies by questioning the effectiveness of the products as well as their safety and the adequacy of tests undertaken to assess that safety, may be testimony to their growing success. 55
Getting organised
This section looks at how the firms described in the section above have organised to represent their interests in India's policy debate on biotechnology and biosafety. While there are some areas of common concern, there are many differences in position between the key national associations active in the debate.
These relate quite strongly to the distinct corporate strategies that firms have adopted, surveyed above.
This section also discusses briefly the role of state-based industry associations in Karnataka to provide an illustration of the nature of links between state level industry associations and the formulation of biotech policy at the national level. What then follows is an exploration of the ways in which these national and state-level bodies are nested within and connected to global industry bodies and coalitions.
The seed industry
There are several industry groupings that serve to support the seed industry in India. The two most prominent are considered to be the Association of the Seed Industry and the Seed Association of India. (ISF 2003) . ASI is also a member of Assocham and CII, discussed below. On the national stage in India, however, it is SAI that has been more prominent in debates about biotechnology development and therefore discussion here will focus on that body.
SAI.
The Seed Association of India has been active on biotech issues (broadly conceived) for a lot longer than either the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), which only became active once the larger biotech firms became interested in modern biotechnology, and the All India Biotech Association (AIBA) which was formed to capitalise on the commercial potential of new innovations in biotech in the Hybrid Seed and a selection of companies with links to multinationals such as Mahyco. These more established firms consider their interests to be well represented by SAI, perhaps unsurprising given that two members of the association worked for Rallis for forty years. 58 The bulk of its membership comes from the South of India in cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad where production is concentrated, even if the trading arm of the companies maintain a presence in Delhi. The group claims to deal more in the problems of smaller traders regarding seed regulations, for example, which differ by state and variety, adding to the burden of smaller firms, and issues such as corruption in certification processes, where dealers and labs are said to be in cohorts, "acting like a mafia" as one seed trader put it. For this reason individuals like Dr. Manmohan Attavar, head of Indo-American Hybrid Seeds, that come from a more traditional plant-breeding background, align themselves politically with the SAI rather than the CII.
Despite this history, SAI shares with associations representing the larger players in the market a concern with the speed of approvals and certification for new hybrids which are described as 'out of date by the time you get certification from government inspectors'. 59 There is a also a shared frustration with burdensome regulations that frustrate the growth of the sector which claims to be subject to 16 separate laws of the GoI. 60 The comment of Dr. Barwale, President of the Association of Seed Industries that 'We will bear the process, but please don't let it break us' seems to capture the fears of many companies that excessive regulation could cripple the performance of their business. 61 This is a complaint extended to biosafety and labelling regulations. According to Arvind Kapur of ProAgro-PGS India, the costs of meeting safety assessments are now so prohibitive that many firms are asking "why bother?" It becomes difficult to keep production costs low in the face of hidden costs from regulation, the demand for more studies and product delays. Referring to calls for rules on labelling and segregation, Kapur claims 'Industry can't afford these legal frameworks'. 62 Pro-Agro is also part of the AIBA and the interventions of Kapur clearly echo the appeals made by that organisation and the CII for a time-bound, one-stop approval process (see below).
On issues directly impinging on the seed industry, the SAI enjoys close relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, and has access to most of the committees hosted by that Ministry dealing with issues such as import clearances, export and quarantine fees and plays an active part in the Seed Policy Review Group. SAI have also been active on issues of plant variety protection and intellectual property rights, where leading personnel express some scepticism about the need for stronger forms of IPR protection, despite the organisations public position, albeit not a forthright one, in favour of strengthened protection. One senior member said that the drive for a "quick-buck" was threatening the sharing of knowledge and innovation. He argues that the "false cry" for IPRs will slow down the development of biotech in India and that, in any case, many proposed systems of IPR protection would be unenforceable. 67 Others express scepticism about the ease with which patent protection can be acquired for minor innovations which are "basically pirated" as one seed trader put it. There are currently estimated to be only 20 companies in India with proprietary hybrids and MNCs tend to only want to work with firms that have access to proprietary germplasm.
Nevertheless, many seed firms place great emphasis on the need for plant variety protection to prevent replication by farmers, even if they acknowledge, in principle, the farmers' right to seed saving and exchange. Divergences between seed companies about the priority that should be attached to crop protection and to market liberalisation and relaxation of controls on foreign ownership reflect their 
The biotech industry
Unlike the SAI, the AIBA (All India Biotech Association) has a much shorter history. Established in 1994, the association represents a smaller number of multinational and Indian agribiotech and pharmaceutical companies in a more promotional capacity. 68 Members of AIBA include Novartis, Monsanto and ProAgro, but the association has no links with the seed industry per se. 70 Some claim the association to be relatively weak and that many of the multinationals that it represents do not really need the body. 71 While the same might equally be said of multinationals that are members of CII, CII does provide them with a greater cover of legitimacy and a more serious platform from which to raise their political concerns than membership of AIBA could provide. Nevertheless, representing larger firms and those with clearly defined interests in biotech means that the association suffers from fewer internal competing and potentially contradictory agendas amongst its membership than the SAI for example.
Its membership composition also explains the position of the association on issues such as IPRs, which they see as key to attracting foreign investors to India. 72 The association's views are leant weight by the interventions of officials such as the US ambassador to India Robert Blackwell who, in an address to the FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry), claimed that the absence of product patent protection in India was a key deterrent to US investment. 73 The other primary areas of concern for AIBA are biosafety regulation and import and excise duty. The head of the association, Vivek Singhal, claims to enjoy "excellent" relations with all the government departments active on the biotech issue, especially the Ministry of Commerce. 74 Former DBT advisor P.K. Ghosh also attends the meetings of the executive committee of the association and the relationship is reciprocated by Vivek Singhal's presence on the Development Task Force of DBT. 75 However, a report produced by the association under the authorship of C.Prakash in 2000 (AIBA 2000a), which was sharply critical of the Indian governments handling of biotech applications, served to sour relations with DBT for a while. The approval process is described by AIBA members as "defunct" and "bogged down in red tape" and "bureaucratic lethargy", with the work of GEAC, in particular, drawing fire for its "procrastination" in causing delays of up to 18 months. In general, however, close relations with key government departments have been used to make the associations views known on what they describe as a "cumbersome" regulatory process in need of simplification and the need for a rationalisation in the number of authorities required to give approval for new products. 76 For AIBA, a key problem is state level government officials without experience or training in the handling of the technologies that are causing delays by refusing to take responsibility for overseeing biosafety measures. Building the capacity of state administrations to cope with trials is, therefore, an important aim for the association. DBT officials concede that regulatory structures at state level are in many ways "ornamental" because of their lack of resources and required training. Nevertheless, some While all the associations described here interact on issues of mutual concern, ties appear to be closer between CII and AIBA, where the latter is indeed a member of the former and CII has people on leave from AIBA. 80 The overlap between the two outfits is perhaps less surprising when we recall who they represent and the preferences these firms have concerning the nature of the regulatory system. CII, for example, endorsed AIBA's controversial report on biotechnology parks (mentioned above) which contained a dogged critique of the existing approval process in India. The SAI also work with CII, however, despite the different degrees of importance they attach to issues such as IPRs. A representative from CII claimed that all three groups are often able to work on a "consensus approach". 81 CII has a membership of over 4,000 companies, including 170 sectoral and regional associations and affiliates. 80 per cent of investment in India is accounted for by CII members that are largely drawn from industry rather than the financial sector. The body has 26 offices in India and 10 overseas, intended to help create a political climate of support for Indian industry. 82 By its own admission it is seen as a "big boys club" in which, although 40 per cent of its members are made up of smaller firms, these companies are less vocal than their larger counterparts. 83 That said, though multinational companies can be members of CII, they enjoy associate rather than full membership which means they do not have voting rights within the organisation.
CII is seen by many government officials and CII's counter-parts in other industry associations as by far the most significant and powerful industry grouping in this debate. By all accounts, it is the most 77 Interview with leading bio-entrepreneur (IS). This section looks at the different dimensions of business influence through the lens of material, institutional and discursive power. Such an approach is helpful in understanding links between the structural power of firms that derives from the resources they provide the state with, the nature of access to key decision-making institutions that they are able to secure as a result of this, and how such access and influence is supported by, and in turn generates, understandings about the strategic importance of biotechnology to the Indian economy. Intricate social and funding ties between policy-makers, industry personnel and media representatives serve to ensure that, despite concerted opposition within some quarters of civil society and within certain parts of the GoI, the prevailing orthodoxy continues to be that the further development of biotechnology is in India's national interest. Emphasising the cultural and discursive elements here is important because, as Scoones (2002) and others have argued, the hype about the potential of the sector, which is helpful in securing access and influence, often far outstrips the material contribution of biotechnology to the growth of the Indian economy to date. Taken together, these forms of influence help to account for the forms and degree of power that industry groups have been able to exercise in the politics of biotechnology in India.
Material
The first thing to note here is the way in which some of the larger firms within the biotech sector have been able to present the interests of their particular fraction of capital as consistent with those of capital in general. Hence, while all sectors and firms compete to demonstrate their strategic importance to the economy of the country in which they are operating, some are better placed to make the case that their activities coincide with the government's own national interests than others. For biotech companies operating in India, the simultaneous potential for high profitability, global market penetration and the prospect of addressing some of India's food security needs, places them well to argue that their in India, the DBT. P.K.Ghosh, former DBT advisor said that 'we have to push this technology . it is good for the country', 112 while Manju Sharma has used her position as DBT Secretary to publicise the benefits of biotechnology for Indian agriculture.
Structural analysis of the relationship between state and business would also suggest that larger businesses tend to enjoy a privileged position with government because governments' depend on them for taxation, employment and legitimacy through their endorsement of government handling of the economy.
In so far as structural power is defined as 'the power to shape the context in which others make decisions' (Strange 1988), the capital mobility that larger firms enjoy heightens their structural power over governments. While access to skilled labour and adequate infrastructure place constraints on where firms can locate, large biotech firms consider themselves to be highly mobile in where they base themselves.
This provides them with a degree of leverage over governments anxious to attract investors where they can exercise a powerful threat to move operations elsewhere. Comparisons with China, discussed below, are invoked by bodies such as the CII, as well as individual firms, to underline the fact that if the Indian government does not send out positive signals about biotech development in the country, there are many other attractive investment locations that firms could move to. Quotes below from government officials testify to the extent to which these fears have registered in their discourse and outlook. What is interesting is that given the cooling of China's attitude towards biotechnology development and growing levels of resistance to GMOs in Thailand, Philippines, Japan and South Korea, the credibility of industry threats to relocate to other countries in the region is diminishing, even though they continue to be used as lever of influence and appear to have been internalised by senior policy-makers.
The perception of the growth potential of biotech in India is endorsed and encouraged by many of the media and business-based narratives discussed below. But its acceptance is also a function of the social networks that bring commercial and policy elites together which help to nurture this consensus. This occurs formally through the organisation of seminars between industry and policy-makers, examples of which are provided above. These occasions are used by government officials such as Manju Sharma to repeat back to industry their own mantras about grasping the nettle of biotechnology, a technology India cannot afford to be without given declining yields, rising populations and millions without access to adequate levels of nutrition. Sharma's talk of the "crisis" in Indian agriculture resonates with the calls of Assocham and others to adopt biotechnology "on emergency footing" given that "Indian agriculture is in an emergency situation" (Assocham 2003) . When DBT secretary she endorsed the highly disputed industry claim that the Indian biotech market was expected to reach $2.5bn by 2001 (Scoones 2002) .
Informally, the message reinforcement occurs through social networks that meet at élite social clubs that business and government personnel frequent in cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad where opinions can be expressed more freely and gossip shared more easily than in formal meetings with government officials. These channels are often especially important for firms whose economic might alone is not sufficient to guarantee the ear of government. Representatives of GMCI and their affiliates, for example, 112 Interview with Dr P.K. Ghosh, then Scientific Advisor, DBT, Delhi, 28 March 2001. are clear about the strategic value of their attendance at the "Bowring institute" and other clubs in Bangalore in order to network and seek to influence officials from the Karnataka state government that frequent the club.
Institutional
The institutional influence that firms are able to enjoy manifests itself more directly in the form of access to committees and key government departments involved in policy-making on biotechnology issues.
While some argue that industry have "tentacles everywhere" within government, 113 in reality the patterns of influence are rather more complicated. It is important then to disaggregate the question of influence and address it in terms of links between particular associations and even at the level of relations between particular firms and specific government departments.
There are multiple formal institutional channels which firms can use to express their concerns and seek to advance their interests. On the formal reporting side, each company conducting biotechnology work is required to have an Institutional Biosafety Committee that sends regular reports and questionnaires on biosafety issues to DBT. Larger agrochemical firms such as Rallis also claim to interact on a regular basis on biosafety issues with key individuals within the national policy process such as P.K.
Ghosh and Manju Sharma. Given the nature of their portfolio, however, their advice is sought more frequently from committees regulating pesticide use where they claim to be heavily involved in "framing the rules". 114 Sometimes it is the case that an association will be invited to comment on proposals, in other cases individual firms will be approached. What is interestingly about firms such as Rallis, with interests in biotech and in pesticide and fertiliser production is that the association through which they channel their concerns differs according to the issue. For example, for inputs on global chemical regulations, Rallis tend to go through CII, whereas for their seed sector interests they use SAI.
Despite industry protestations of lack of consultation over the design of regulations, a more plausible explanation is that while they enjoy close relations with some parts of government, this is not the case with all government departments. For example, while relations with ministries such as commerce and industry are good, biotech firms have been less successful at getting a sympathetic hearing for their concerns with the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Firms that belong to CII and AIBA have been strongly supportive of common approaches to risk assessment and the use of principles such as substantial equivalence and familiarity, reflecting their ties to global industry groupings such as BIO (Newell 2002) . They have been unable to persuade environment bureaucrats of the merits of approaches to regulation such as these that are minimally disruptive of global trade, however. While there is some acceptance among government bureaucrats of the value of standards on risk being set internationally and there exists some support for "mutual recognition" of other countries risk assessment procedures, there is 113 Interview with NGO representative, New Delhi, 4 April 2001. 114 Interview with senior official within, Rallis, Bangalore, 11 May 2001. reluctance among MoEF representatives to 'rely on trials from the U.S and Europe' as a basis for approving crops in India. 115 On this and other issues, firms express frustration because MoEF officials tend not to be technical specialists but general IAS (Indian Administrative Service) officers. Because personnel there change every couple of years, firms feel officials there need to be "educated" each time on the technical aspects of the biotech issue. Whilst acknowledging that 'things only happen when industry pushes ', 116 MoEF are critical nevertheless of the intensity of industry lobbying on the issue which they regard as excessive. Given this pattern of interaction, it is perhaps unsurprising that NGOs go to MoEF first, rather than other ministries and departments that are considered to be more receptive to industry positions on the issue 117 , despite the fact that MoEF is seen to be weaker within the overall process.
While CII and AIBA appear to enjoy more influence with DBT and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry than with the Ministry of Agriculture, SAI has closer links with the latter. 118 As perhaps the most significant seed association in India, an important aspect of SAI's mandate has been to cultivate close links with the Ministry of Agriculture. Seshia notes, 'To this end it has established itself as an industry representative within policy networks by, for example, securing seats on a number of government committees' which provide 'a base from which to influence policy ' (2002: 2744) . DBT, on the other hand, is accused by opponents of biotech to operate, essentially, as the mouthpiece of multinational biotech firms. DBT's then Scientific Adviser, P.K.Ghosh in particular was lambasted by the Delhi press in 1998 over allegations of collusion with Monsanto-MAHYCO and by activists for his over-zealous approach to endorsing the company's application without due regard for the procedures set up to approve GMOs.
Those involved in decision-making on the RCGM and GEAC approval committees comment on the way in which "Ghosh speeds the process up" by bundling together a series of requests for approval. 119 This haste, however, has resulted in Vandana Shiva's organisation 'Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology' bringing a case before the Supreme Court of India over the authority of the body that approved trials of the controversial Bt cotton crop (RFSTE 2002) . Critics also allege a proindustry bias in the selection of scientists that sit on the RCGM and GEAC committees to the exclusion of critics. 120 Scoones (2003) There is some evidence also of a strong degree of overlap between the DBT and the industry whose activities it is meant to regulate, raising concerns that have been raised elsewhere about the ability of the same agency to simultaneously be a "promoter" of a technology and a "protector" against the risks associated with it (Jasanoff 1995) . To take one example, Dr S.R. Rao of the DBT was formerly involved in developing a strand of biotechnology-related work with Rallis corporation in Bangalore. 122 Suspicions about the unhealthy degree of interaction between DBT and the biotech companies it regulates, are compounded by incidental evidence of the ties between the two such as the Mahyco calendar which hung on P.K. Ghosh's wall or the Monsanto diary-filofax that sits on S.R. Rao's desk in the DBT.
The close relationship industry is said to have with DBT is also manifested in closed workshops organised by industry associations such as the SAI and CII and senior DBT staff including P.K.Ghosh and Manju Sharma where common problems are shared and proposed strategies for promoting biotechnology discussed. In July 2001 (27-19), CII organised a major conference for example on 'Biotechnology on the fast track: realising regulatory reform'. These meetings with DBT are significant from an industry point of view, not only because of the department's strategic role in the regulatory process, but also because it determines the allocation of budget resources for biotechnology research. Despite the closeness of the relationship between some biotech firms and the DBT, many firms are damning of the delays in the approval process which they put down to DBT stalling because of its overcautious approach to biotech (AIBA 2000a) . Firms such as Monsanto India complain of the broad range and questionable necessity of some of the tests they have to undertake to assess the biosafety of their products. 123 Many such studies on pollen flow, or effects on cattle are deemed to be "irrelevant" resulting from bureaucratic imperatives to ensure that the regulations are seen as legitimate and to be seen to be doing something. 124 Individuals within the DBT express some sympathy with the view that current testing procedures are "unworkable" and the concern that the peer-review system is "over-done". Echoing a point raised above, there is a suspicion on the part of some biotech firms that businesses whose core investments are in pesticides and chemicals and with whom the government traditionally has enjoyed a close relationship, are using fears about biotechnology applications to slow the growth of the industry as it competes directly with their potential share of the market. In reality, the fact that cotton is the first crop to go through the system may explain the protracted nature of the process on this occasion. And in spite of Ibid. these complaints, many observers of the process have also noted a warming and a closening of relations between DBT and the biotechnology industry, such that the department now "has the confidence of industry" and that they can work as "partners". 125 This warming follows a cooling of relations following the highly critical "Biotechnology Parks" report produced by AIBA back in 2000, and appears to have intensified following the decision to approve Bt cotton for commercial release in March 2002.
Discursive
Besides the material power wielded by some biotech firms and the level of access and influence that they are able to secure through institutional means, an important part of the story is the social construction of the commercial potential of biotechnology. Media framings help to boost perceptions of the material potential of the sector as well as ensure high levels of government interest in the industry's activities, key to sustaining institutional access. There appears to be an intimate relationship between each of these dimensions, therefore, where material power helps to secure institutional access and both interactions with policy communities and the economic potential of the sector create a conducive environment for the construction of discourses supportive of biotech development. In turn, the prevalence and potency of discourses about the centrality of biotechnology to India's ability to meet broader development goals of growth and food security creates space for institutional access and helps to encourage investment in the biotech sector.
Despite the limited ability of firms to deliver a pro-poor biotechnology under existing circumstances and their professed reluctance to accept this role, which they see as primarily a public sector responsibility, 126 the case for biotechnology development in a country like India is premised on a set of assumptions that leading firms have played a key part in constructing and embedding in policy debate.
Key government officials repeat back the central mantras of declining productivity, lack of fertile lands, and rising costs of inputs that are said to make biotechnology the "only way" forward. 127 Though it remains removed from the reality of lack of progress and poor incentive structures for industry to perform the role set for it, the narrative about the potential of biotechnology to meet the needs of the poor serves to reassure investors and suspicious publics about the technology. Important for our purposes here, however, is the way in which these projections, assumptions and myths are internalised and carried forward in policy discourse by influential players within key government departments. through constant repetition and uncritical acceptance is unquestionable. 129 Biotech companies gain materially from such an association with the IT "success" story. The Minister of Finance has granted biotech companies the same entitlements as the other "sunrise" industries such as IT, including tax holidays and exemptions from customs duty, for example. 130 There are many contestable assumptions behind media-led social constructions of the seamless continuity from the IT to BT revolutions around the level of skills required to sustain the shift and about the types of government intervention that are necessary to support these new market players, but such details are overlooked in the rush to sell India as a prime biotech location for investors. 131 Despite more critical coverage in papers such as The Hindu or the Indian Express, key daily national papers such as the Economic Times play an important role in this process, a newspaper which Sharma describes as "the mouthpiece of industry". 132 Both Time magazine India and Economic Times adopt a broadly pro-biotech line, but it is the ET which is taken most seriously by government. 133 In terms of magazines and weekly journals, India Today is seen as more pro-government and less critical, but with a huge circulation it is taken seriously by politicians. 134 Business World and Business Line also play an important role within the biotech sector in promoting the attractiveness of investing in the sector and lending support to claims regarding its growth potential. Economic Times reported that the bioinformatics sector in India is registering per annum growth of 90 per cent. 135 Similarly, Kiran Muzumdar-Shaw is quoted as suggesting that the biotech business in India will reach $1.5 billion by 2007 136 and The Financial Express cites back the same figure uncritically, gleaned from a CII report on the subject. 137 These magazines and newspapers have played a key role in terms of selling the potential of Indian firms to global audiences, faithfully and regularly reporting statements from leading pro-biotech NRIs (Non-Resident Indians) such as C.S. Prakash, endorsing the government's approval of Bt cotton for example. 138 The views of bodies such as the Foundation for Biotechnology Awareness and Education, which aims to generate beneficial publicity about the benefits of biotechnology for Indian agriculture, are frequently reported. The opinions of leading industry bodies are taken as an adequate statement of truth in the debate in much of the mainstream media. In a story on the problems associated with India's patent legislation, Business Standard concludes; 'India requires a strong patent regime to encourage research and development. Intellectual property rights must be used to build an asset base'. 139 The same publication 129 also attributes the success of Bangalore in attracting biotech investors to the "single clearance for investors", endorsing the calls of industry associations for such clearance at national level. 140 Sector specific magazines such as Chemical Weekly also play an important role in hyping the sector's success. The magazine ran a story claiming, for example, that the Indian biotech sector is on the "fast track to catch up with western countries" and is "on the threshold of a big revolution". 141 One recurrent feature of this general narrative about the enormous potential of agricultural biotechnology and the urgency with which it is to be tapped is the "myth of the biotech superpower", China. The analysis underpinning this narrative is weak on detail, importantly regarding the extent to which there is scope to apply in India the Chinese model of agribiotech development. Key differences that are often glossed over in the rush to present China as a viable model for India to follow include; the different capacities for public sector research, the contrasting role of civil society in contesting the benefits of the technology and the divergent degrees of dependence on external market acceptance as opposed to producing for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, the success of biotech developments to date in China is a common point of reference for government officials who readily cite the savings in pesticide use, the absence of detrimental environmental affects and the positive benefits accruing to smaller farmers reported in studies from China. 142 Slow-downs in the process are regarded as missed opportunities to catch-up with China. P.K. Ghosh, former advisor to DBT and member secretary of the RCGM committee, regrets that when Monsanto and Mahyco proposed cotton back in 1993, a decision was stalled which meant that India "lost the bus" that would have allowed them to surpass China's technological supremacy in this area. 143 Industry groups such as CII also create this sense of a zero-sum competition between India and China, where potential investors are "waiting and watching" to see which signals the government sends out about its likely stance on approvals for LMOs, in order to create pressure on government officials to hasten the approval process.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to identify and explain the ways in which different firms affected by and involved in the debate about the role of biotechnology in Indian agriculture have sought to advance their interests. It has been argued that the public positions of larger biotech and agro-chemical companies, seed enterprises and newer start-up firms and the associations they belong to relate to the differences in their underlying corporate strategies. The extent to which these firms are involved in primary research, export their products or require protection for their products helps to determine their political affiliations to the leading industry bodies that are active on biotechnology issues. In turn, each of these associations has been shown to have distinct patterns of interaction with particular government agencies involved in the Assessing in precise terms the degree of influence that these industry actors have had upon the course of biotechnology policy in India is a fruitless endeavour. It is clear though that through a combination of material influence, in most cases high levels of institutional access, and in a context in which claims about the benefits of biotechnology are echoed and repeated in influential media, industry, some firms more than others, has played an important role in the evolving regulatory regime. Reasons for this include the expertise and economic weight of these actors and the fact they are providing a technology which ostensibly has the potential to directly address many of the most pressing problems India faces. Smaller actors in the vast seed sector in India are, as yet, barely involved directly in the current debate about India's "gene revolution". While they are happy for a body like the SAI to present their concerns to government regarding laws governing seed markets and more generic concerns about competition from foreign seed producers, they are not at the frontline of debates about the role of biotechnology in Indian agriculture. Instead, the policy agenda in Delhi appears to be far more influenced by a fairly close-knit policy network of biotech entrepreneurs from larger multinationals and successful start-up firms such as BioCon with good national and global connections. While SAI has the ear of the Ministry of Agriculture on issues of seed certification and plant variety protection, the DBT finds support for its pro-biotech position from the drivers of the technology, the major biotech firms themselves.
Whose influence runs furthest will depend on the respective priority that the government attaches to biotechnology promotion as opposed to biosafety protection, or to patent protection as opposed to looser systems of crop protection. In essence, it will rest on the perceived role of biotechnology in India's development trajectory, decisions about which forms of biotechnology development are considered to be most consistent with the national interest, and choices about the appropriate role in this development of foreign investors as opposed to domestic enterprises. Given the enormity and economic and global significance of these choices, we can expect to see continued intense engagement with the policy-process by all actors with a stake in the issue. It is clear at the moment that larger biotech multinational companies have been reasonably successful in associating their own narrow commercial interests with the broader development goals of the Indian state. It is ironic that they have achieved this at a time when many other countries, notably the very country they seem to regard as their greatest competitor, China, has made a relative retreat from its former unbridled support for the technology. China should offer a salutary lesson in this regard. The battle to define biotechnology futures and whom the technology should serve will not be won easily in India or anywhere else. It will be waged for many more years, subject to ongoing contestation by each of the actors discussed in this paper.
